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Abstract 
Behavioral decision theories aim to explain human behavior. Can they help predict it? An open 
tournament for prediction of human choices in fundamental economic decision tasks is 
presented. The results suggest that integration of certain behavioral theories as features in 
machine learning systems provides the best predictions. Surprisingly, the most useful theories for 
prediction build on basic properties of human and animal learning and are very different from 
mainstream decision theories that focus on deviations from rational choice. Moreover, we find 
that theoretical features should be based not only on qualitative behavioral insights (e.g. “loss 
aversion”), but also on quantitative behavioral foresights generated by functional descriptive 
models (e.g. Prospect Theory). Our analysis prescribes a recipe for derivation of explainable, 
useful predictions of human decisions. 
 
                                                 
1 Correspondence to: oplonsky@gmail.com 
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Many societal and engineering problems can benefit enormously from accurate 
predictions of human decisions. For example, good predictions of human decisions to moral 
dilemmas can inform the development of autonomous vehicles and the design of life-saving 
kidney exchange programs (1–3). Machine learning methods have had impressive success in 
predicting human decisions when trained on large amount of data (4–7). However, when the data 
available for training is relatively small, like in many decision-making domains of interest to 
social scientists, purely data-driven methods have had mixed success. For example, such 
methods led to good performance in prediction of human decisions in economic games (8, 9), but 
performed much worse than purely behavioral models in prediction of human decisions between 
lotteries (10, 11).  
To improve predictive performance, one can leverage the available data with knowledge 
from behavioral decision theories, commonly by supplying a machine learning system with 
theoretically-driven features (11–13). The most natural candidates for such features are 
behavioral insights: qualitative human tendencies documented by the behavioral literature, such 
as loss aversion (14, 15). Machine learning methods provided with various insights as features 
are then meant to learn from the data how to integrate them for best predictions. A less common 
type of theoretically-driven features are behavioral foresights. These are quantitative descriptive 
models, such as Prospect Theory (15, 16), that serve to provide a functional integration of several 
behavioral tendencies. In other words, a foresight provides a model-based theory-driven 
prediction for behavior in a task, whereas an insight merely reflects one aspect that might impact 
behavior in the task.  
3 
 
 
The distinction between insights and foresights is akin to an old distinction between 
experts making a global prediction and merely identifying elements likely to be important in 
making a prediction (17, 18). For example, Einhorn gave expert pathologists biopsy slides taken 
from patients diagnosed with Hodgkin’s disease and asked them to come up with histological 
characteristics they considered important for prediction of survival time, as well as provide 
global outcome predictions. The results showed that the predictions of a statistical tool 
combining only the expert-derived characteristics are far more accurate than the predictions 
provided by the experts themselves, and the predictions are not always improved when the global 
predictions are added as additional features (17). Similarly, foresights, which are essentially a 
researcher’s integration of several behavioral insights, might not be as useful for prediction as 
the insights they are composed of. Advances in machine learning over the past five decades 
make it even more reasonable to assume that a computational system is likely to provide a more 
useful integration of the behavioral insights, rendering the use of foresights useless.  
Nevertheless, here we demonstrate, using the results of an open competition for the 
prediction of human choices in a fundamental economic decisions task, that successful (i.e. 
reasonably predictive) behavioral models (foresights) make very useful features and that both 
behavioral insights and behavioral foresights are vital for achieving state-of-the-art predictions of 
human decisions. Our analysis prescribes a recipe for the design of effective tools for predicting 
human decisions when data are limited: Start with a quantitative descriptive model of behavior in 
the task (a foresight), decompose it to its behavioral-decision-theory elements (insights), and 
then supply a machine learning algorithm with both the foresights and the insights as features, 
assuming that their best integration will be recovered from the available data. Our results further 
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indicate that the most useful sets of features rely on models that differ from the popular 
descriptive decision theories in important ways. 
Choice Prediction Competition 
Five of the authors of this paper (OP, RA, EE, MT, & IE; hereinafter the organizers) 
organized CPC18: a choice prediction competition for human choice between lotteries over time 
(https://cpc-18.com). Choice between lotteries underlies both the foundations of rational 
economic theory (19, 20) and the analyses of robust deviations from rational choice (15, 21). The 
data used in the competition is the largest of its kind ever collected. It contains 270 binary choice 
problems selected from a single space, including demonstrations of 14 classical choice anomalies 
documented in behavioral decision research (e.g. the St. Petersburg’s (22), Allais’ (23) and 
Ellsberg’s (24) paradoxes). Importantly, it also includes choice behavior over time after the 
decision-maker receives feedback regarding previous choices, as well as choice problems in 
which the probabilities of one option are unknown at the time of choice (decisions under 
ambiguity). Of the 270 problems, 150 were used in a previous choice prediction competition 
(CPC15) (10). These problems were complemented with 60 additional problems (Experiment 1) 
to form a public dataset available for training of competing models. CPC18 included two 
independent tracks. In this paper, we focus mainly on the first track, in which participants were 
required to develop a model predicting the distribution of play in 60 additional problems 
(Experiment 2). These 60 problems and the results of Experiment 2 were published only after the 
deadline for submission to the competition has passed2. 
                                                 
2 In the second track, participants were required to predict the decisions made by specific individual 
decision-makers in problems that were part of the training data (of course, choices of those individuals in those 
problems was not available for training). That is, the first track requires modelling of the average population choice 
given a choice problem, whereas the second track requires modelling of individual decision-makers. Therefore, the 
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The organizers also published two baseline models for the first track. Such models 
facilitate the evaluation of developed models at an early stage, as they provide a benchmark for 
the level of performance achievable in the prediction task. The first baseline was a purely 
behavioral model (i.e. it did not use machine learning), an adaptation of the model BEAST 
(acronym for best estimate and sampling tools) which has proven to be a very good predictor for 
behavior in CPC15 (10). Notably, BEAST does not share the assumptions made by popular 
decision theories like Expected Utility Theory (19) and Prospect Theory (15, 21). Rather, it 
assumes choice over time is mainly driven by two behavioral mechanisms: sensitivity to the 
expected values and to the probability of experienced regret (and less sensitivity to four 
additional mechanisms, see supplementary text). The second baseline model was Psychological 
Forest (11), a hybrid of machine learning and behavioral theories. It includes both behavioral 
insights, the theoretical foundations of BEAST, and a behavioral foresight, the predictions of 
BEAST itself, as features. In choosing to include both types of features, the developers of 
Psychological Forest made, to the best of our knowledge, a rather unique design choice. More 
specifically, the developers of the model first decomposed BEAST to six theoretical decision 
mechanisms it assumes, then hand-crafted 13 features based on these six mechanisms, and 
finally used these 13 features, as well as the quantitative predictions of BEAST itself, in a 
Random Forest algorithm (25) (see supplementary text). Notably, the organizers could not find a 
good predictive baseline model that did not use any behavioral foresights (e.g. using only 
                                                                                                                                                             
training data in the second track is effectively much larger than the training data in the first track, and we might 
expect that in the first track data-driven methods would benefit more from augmentation of behavioral features. The 
SI provides further details on the second track. Two of the authors of this paper (ECC & JFC) made the winning 
submission to this second track. 
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insights). They posited that if not using foresights can help predictions, the results of the 
competition would reflect it. 
Forty-six teams registered to the first track of the competition. Team members included 
69 researchers representing 34 institutions from 16 countries. Many of the teams invested 
significant efforts in developing their models. For example, in a post-competition survey 
(N = 29; see supplementary text), the reported mean number of hours spent on development of 
models was 66 (SD = 92). Twenty models were submitted in time. All submitted models but one 
made at least some use of behavioral decision theories, suggesting it is not easy to predict 
behavior in this task without them. Seven submissions were hybrid models integrating machine 
learning with behavioral theories. All hybrid submissions used both behavioral insights and 
behavioral foresights as features, suggesting using both types of features is useful for prediction.  
The winning submission, made by five of the authors of this paper (DB, JCP, DR, TLG, 
& SJR), is based on the machine learning-behavioral decision theories hybrid baseline 
Psychological Forest. Specifically, it uses an Extreme Gradient Boosting algorithm (26) with the 
same features used in Psychological Forest (i.e. including both the behavioral insights and the 
behavioral foresight, the predictions of BEAST). Further details on the winning submission are 
in the supplementary text. To interpret the level of predictive performance of the winner and 
other predictors, we use a monotonous transformation of the prediction mean squared error 
(MSE) called an equivalent number of observations (ENO) (27). ENO of a model is an estimate 
for the number of agents for whom data should be collected until their mean behavior provides a 
better prediction for the behavior of the next agent than the predictions of the model. The ENO 
of the winner is 23.7, meaning we would need to observe the choices of 24 decision-makers 
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before the observed choice will become a better prediction for behavior of a new agent than the 
predictions of the winner.  
The only submission that did not integrate any knowledge from behavioral decision 
theories was ranked only 16th, predicting significantly worse than the winner (95% bootstrap CI 
for the differences in squared errors over the problems in the test set: [0.044,0.483]), and 
achieving ENO of 15.2. The best submission that did not use any machine learning (i.e. a purely 
behavioral model heavily based on BEAST) was ranked 2nd and did not predict significantly 
worse than the winning submission (95% bootstrap CI for the differences in squared errors over 
the problems in the test set: [−0.135,0.175]), obtaining ENO of 22.7. According to a bootstrap 
analysis, 14 submissions did not predict significantly worse than the winner. Table S1 provides 
details on these submissions.  
The results of the competition imply that for prediction of human decisions in this 
fundamental economic decisions task, consideration of behavioral decision theories is vital. 
Furthermore, they show that the best predictions are obtained by a machine learning model that 
uses both behavioral insights and a behavioral foresight as features.  
Post-competition Analyses 
Both insights and foresights? 
Every hybrid machine learning-behavioral decision theory submission included both 
behavioral insights and at least one behavioral foresight as features. We checked whether both 
types of features were really necessary by training models that do not include each type and 
checking their predictive performance in the competition’s data. Specifically, we trained on 
CPC18’s training data both a random forest (using R package randomforest (28)) and an extreme 
gradient boosting algorithm (using R package xgboost (29)) each using a subset of the features 
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used by the baseline psychological forest and the competition’s winner. We then let the trained 
models predict CPC18’s held-out competition data. In the “only insights” condition, the only 
feature removed was the predictions of BEAST (the foresight). In the “only foresight” condition, 
the models were trained using 15 features: 14 dimensions defining the choice problem and the 
predictions of BEAST. In training, hyper-parameters used were the same as in the baseline and 
winner. 
Figure 1 displays the results of this analysis. It shows that both the winner and the hybrid 
baseline models trained without either type of behavioral features provide predictions that are 
worse – sometime much worse – than when the models include both types of features. These 
results imply that using both behavioral insights, and especially successful behavioral foresights 
is key for obtaining good predictive performance. 
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Figure 1. CPC18 Prediction error with and without insight and foresight features. Higher ENO 
(equivalent number of observations) and lower MSE (mean squared error) scores are better. Each 
algorithm was trained on the CPC18 training data (human decisions in 210 choice problems) using in 
addition a set of non-theoretical features defining the choice problem. Predictions are made for CPC18 
test data (human decisions in 60 choice problems). Psychological Forest is the hybrid baseline model for 
the competition. The winner used the same feature set but replaced the algorithm used. Insights are 
features crafted from qualitative human tendencies found in behavioral decision research. Foresights are 
quantitative predictions of a descriptive model integrating multiple insights. 
Which foresight is most useful for predictions? 
Interestingly, all 7 hybrid submissions used as a foresight the predictions of BEAST or 
the predictions of a close variant of BEAST. As mentioned, BEAST is very different than 
classical decision models. Most classical decision models were developed to explain 
inconsistencies between observed behavior and the rational benchmark, under the assumption 
that agents facing decisions under risk understand and believe the descriptions of the payoff 
distributions. In contrast, BEAST, which builds on research investigating the effects of feedback, 
was developed to predict behavior also when this assumption is violated. For example, feedback 
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strongly affects behavior even in decisions under risk, where it does not add information for 
agents who understand and believe the instructions (30–34). Does the prevalent use of BEAST 
rather than more classical decision models as foresights imply that BEAST is more effective for 
prediction of choice behavior? If so, it may suggest that the underlying assumptions BEAST 
makes are more useful for predicting behavior than those made by classical decisions models.  
We checked how the predictions of BEAST, either on its own, or when used as a 
foresight-feature in a machine learning system, compare with the predictions of more classical 
decision models. The comparison regards only a subset of the competition’s data which was the 
main focus of classical decision research: decisions under risk without feedback (i.e. we only 
used choices made in problems without ambiguity in the first block of five trials in each 
problem). In this no-feedback subset of the data, which includes 230 different choice problems, 
BEAST should be at a significant disadvantage since its main assumptions concern the effects of 
feedback.  
To perform this comparison, each model we considered, except BEAST, was fitted to the 
aggregate choice rates of the 182 of these problems that were part of CPC18’s training data, 
using a grid search. Then, the trained models all predicted the aggregate choice in the 48 
problems that were part of CPC18’s competition data. BEAST was compared to two versions 
Cumulative Prospect Theory (21), the Priority Heuristic (35), and to the Decisions by Sampling 
(36) model. The SI provides the implementations used. After deriving the predictions of each 
model, we also used those predictions as a foresight feature in an off-the-shelf random forest 
algorithm (using package randomForest (28) in R), without any training of hyperparameters. As 
additional features, (beyond the foresight feature), we used the 12 between-problem parameters 
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that define each choice problem. The reported MSEs are the average of 20 runs of the random 
forest.  
The results of this exercise (Table 1) first show that, in every case, using the predictions 
of a theoretical model as a foresight feature leads to improved predictions than using the 
predictions themselves. Further they show that BEAST, with parameters fitted to the entire 
training data (including problems with ambiguity and choice following feedback) predicts the 
decisions-under-risk subset of the data far better than any of the classical decision models tested 
(fit only on the decisions-under-risk subset of the training data). For this subset of the data, the 
ENO of BEAST used as a sole behavioral feature is 16.75. The second-best predictor, a 
stochastic version of Cumulative Prospect Theory, only achieves ENO of 7.57, so its predictive 
accuracy is less than half that of BEAST. This exercise suggests that using the predictions of a 
theoretical model as a foresight feature is always a good idea, but to get good predictive 
performance, the theoretical model itself needs to have good a-priori predictions3. Therefore, we 
suggest that when predicting human decision with limited data, one should start with a good 
descriptive model, and the better the predictions of the descriptive model, the better the final 
predictions are likely to be. More importantly, these results suggest that the assumption that 
agents understand and believe the instructions, which underlies classical behavioral decision 
research, should be reconsidered. 
Table 1: Prediction error for decision under risk subset of competition data 
                                                 
3 More accurately, when the machine learning algorithm is tree-based, the theoretical model need not 
necessarily have a low prediction error, but a high resolution score (65) essentially meaning the model discriminates 
well between different inputs which provide different outputs. For example, using as feature the predictions of 
BEAST, ŷi, is just as useful as using its complement, 1-ŷi, though the prediction error of the latter is clearly much 
higher than that of the former (yet they have the exact same resolution score, as linear transformations do not change 
the resolution). 
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 On its own As a Foresight 
Model MSE ENO MSE ENO 
BEAST  0.0100 15.24 0.0092 16.75 
Stochastic CPT 0.0198 7.24 0.0190 7.57 
Deterministic CPT  0.1406 0.97 0.0232 6.13 
Decision by Sampling  0.0434 3.20 0.0311 4.51 
Priority Heuristic  0.2378 0.57 0.0375 3.72 
Note. All models except BEAST were trained on the outcomes of 182 decisions under risk problems from 
CPC18 training set. BEAST was trained to fit the same problems but also following feedback, as well as 
28 decisions under ambiguity problems. Trained models predicted 48 decisions-under-risk problems in 
the CPC18 held-out set. Predictions are either taken at face value or used as a feature (foresight) in a 
Random Forest algorithm. ENO = equivalent number of observations. MSE = Mean Squared Error. 
BEAST = Best Estimate and Sampling Tools. CPT = Cumulative Prospect Theory. 
Robustness Checks and Additional Datasets 
We checked for the robustness of our proposed method in two additional datasets of 
human decisions in extensive form games (37). To avoid having too many researchers’ degrees 
of freedom (i.e. being able to select the method and/or analyses contingent on the outputs of the 
analyses; , 38), we repeated the same exact procedure used in the development of Psychological 
Forest: We started with a descriptive model that was proposed as a baseline in a choice 
prediction competition (i.e. developed before the collection of the test data), decomposed it to its 
theoretical insights and then used both the predictions of the model and the insights as features 
within a Random Forest algorithm (see SI). The results show that in both cases, the predictions 
of the constructed hybrid model outperform the predictions of the descriptive model in the test 
set of the competition and those of the same model using only one type of behavioral features 
(see details in SI). Moreover, in one of the datasets, the constructed hybrid model also 
outperformed all other models submitted to the competition, thus providing a new state-of-the-art 
for these data. 
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Interpreting the Predictions of the Hybrid Model 
A central aspect determining the usability of a predictive model by some stakeholders is 
interpretability. Decision-makers want not only a prediction for what is going to happen, but also 
a reason for why it is going to happen (39). Data-driven methods usually have very good 
predictive performance, but their outputs are rarely easily explainable. Descriptive models 
normally do not have such weakness, though their predictive power is often worse than that of 
data-driven methods. A nice characteristic of the method we introduce here is that in many cases, 
the predictions made by the hybrid model are highly correlated with the predictions made by the 
descriptive model used as foresight. For example, the correlation between the predictions of the 
winning submission in CPC18 and the foresight it uses, BEAST, is 0.963. This characteristic is 
of course more likely when the descriptive model performs reasonably well on its own. When it 
does, the main mechanisms underlying the foresight can be used to explain why the hybrid 
model predicts what it predicts. On its own, analyzing the mechanics of an Extreme Gradient 
Boosting algorithm supplied with 38 features (the number of features used by the winning 
submission) is impractical. However, since we know the prediction correlation with BEAST is so 
high, we can reason that in almost every case, the predicted decisions are driven mainly by the 
expected values and the probability of experienced regret from an option (i.e. the main 
mechanics of BEAST).  
Discussion 
A main goal in behavioral science is to explain behavior. Congruently, most behavioral 
scientists tend to focus on uncovering causal mechanisms and discovering interesting phenomena 
(40). In theory, outputs of this type of research can be useful for prediction as well. Based on our 
analysis, we think that to facilitate the move from elegant explanations to useful predictions, two 
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points should be considered. First, most explanation-focused research concentrates on identifying 
and isolating specific mechanisms affecting behavior. For prediction, these can serve as useful 
behavioral insight features. Yet, our finding that behavioral foresights, which aim to integrate 
multiple mechanisms, is vital for deriving good predictions, suggests that behavioral scientists 
should focus more on the interactions and relative importance of the various mechanisms and 
develop quantitative models integrating these mechanisms.  
Second, the focus on interesting phenomena in behavioral science inevitably leads to the 
study of uncommon situations. These can shed light on many important theoretical questions, but 
for prediction, it is better to build on insights that are robust across a wide array of situations. We 
speculate that this second point is the reason for the predictive superiority of BEAST over 
classical decision models even on a subset of the data it should have a disadvantage in (Table 1). 
Research leading to classical decision models focused on the set of situations in which agents 
understand and believe the information they are given, but if this set is not widespread then the 
resulting models will be less useful for predictions. In contrast, BEAST builds on research of 
basic learning processes. Many of these processes are shared by both people and animals (41, 
42), which may hint to their commonality in nature. We thus think behavioral scientists would be 
wise to reconsider the sets of situations they investigate.  
We believe that the noisy and complex nature of human behavior raises many challenges 
to machine learning methods whose study can be of interest to the machine learning community. 
Specifically, in our setting, state-of-the-art predictions of human decisions requires a 
combination of theoretical elements from behavioral decision research and data-driven machine 
learning systems. This calls for more use of data science practices within behavioral sciences as 
well as more use of behavioral theories when data scientists aim to predict human behavior (43). 
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That is probably easier said than done. For example, Psychological Forest was developed by 
behavioral scientists using one of the easiest-to-train off-the-shelf machine learning algorithms, 
Random Forest. Yet, to further improve performance, the expertise and experience of data 
scientists using a more sophisticated algorithm were required. Similarly, many data scientists 
reading behavioral theory papers might not be able to easily translate them to a set of features 
that can be used within their systems. A nuanced understanding of the mechanics may be 
required in order to do so. Hence, it seems that the best prospect for development of good 
predictive models of human behavior may lie in more collaborations between behavioral 
scientists and data scientists.  
Methods 
Experimental task. 
The task used in CPC18 is of binary choice under risk, under ambiguity, and from 
experience. The experimental paradigm is identical to that used in CPC15 (10). Decision-makers 
are faced with descriptions of two monetary prospects (Option A and Option B) and are asked to 
choose between them repeatedly for 25 trials. In the first five trials, decision-makers do not 
receive feedback on their choice. After each trial thereafter (trials 6-25), decision-makers get full 
feedback concerning the outcomes generated by each option in that trial (both the obtained 
payoff and the forgone payoff are revealed). Each option in each problem represents a payoff 
distribution with between one and 10 possible outcomes. In addition, Option B may be 
ambiguous in which case its description does not include the probabilities of its possible 
outcomes, and the payoffs provided by the two options may be correlated. Figures S1-S3 show 
examples of the experimental screen in three problems. 
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More specifically, each choice problem participants faced belongs to a 14-dimensional 
space of problems, an extension of the space studied in CPC15 (10), in which it has been shown 
that 14 classical behavioral decision making phenomena emerge (these are: Allais’ paradox (23), 
the reflection effect (15), overweighting of rare events (15), loss aversion (15), St. Petersburg’s 
paradox (22), Ellsberg’s paradox (24), low magnitudes eliminate loss aversion (44), break-even 
effect (45), get-something effect (46), splitting effect (47), underweighting of rare events (48), 
reversed reflection effect (48), payoff variability effect (49), correlation effect (50)). The 
extension of the current space is that now both options (rather than just one) can have up to 10 
outcomes.  
Two of the 14 dimensions in the space (Block and Feedback), are studied within problem. 
The 25 choice trials are divided to 5 blocks of 5 trials each, such that Feedback is absent in the 
1st block and complete in the other four blocks. The other 12 dimensions uniquely define a 
choice problem: 5 dimensions represent each of the two options’ payoff distributions, and two 
additional dimensions define whether Option B is ambiguous (in which case its description does 
not include the probabilities of its possible outcomes) and whether the payoffs provided by the 
two options are correlated. The SI provides a detailed description of the space of problems 
investigated. 
Experimental data. 
The data used in CPC18 includes 694,500 decisions made by 926 different decision-
makers made across 270 binary choice problems drawn from the space we consider. Problems 
are divided into 9 cohorts. Each decision-maker faced one cohort of 30 problems in random 
order and made 25 choices in each problem. The first five cohorts were also used in CPC15 (10), 
and details on these data are provided elsewhere. The problems in the four additional cohorts 
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were randomly selected from the space of problems investigated in CPC18 according to a pre-
defined problem selection algorithm (see SI). Two cohorts of problems were then run in each of 
two new experiments that used similar design and participant pool to those used for CPC15. 
In each experiment, 240 decision-makers (Experiment 1: 139 females, MAge = 24.5, 
RangeAge = [18,37]; Experiment 2: 141 females, MAge = 24.7, RangeAge = [18,50]) participated in 
the experiment, half at the Technion and half at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Most 
participants were undergraduate students. Informed consent was elicited from all participants at 
the beginning of the experimental session. The experiment lasted approximately 45 minutes. 
Participants were paid for one randomly selected choice they made, in addition to a show-up fee. 
The final payoff ranged between 10 and 136 shekels, with a mean of 40 (about 11 USD) for 
Experiment 1 and between 10 and 183 shekels, with a mean of 41.9 for Experiment 2. 
Experiments were approved by the Social and Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board in 
the Technion and by the Ethics Committee for Human Studies at the Faculty of Agriculture, 
Food, and Environment at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. 
Choice prediction competition. 
In May-June 2017, the organizers ran Experiment 1. They then used the combined data 
from Experiment 1 and from CPC15 to develop their baseline models (see SI) and made the data 
publicly available (51). In January 2018, they published the call to participate in the competition 
in major mailing lists and on social media. The competition included two independent 
challenges, and in this paper, we focus on the first (see SI for second track details). In that 
challenge, the goal was to provide, for each of 60 choice problems from Experiment 2 (run in 
June-July 2018), a prediction for the progression over time of the mean aggregate choice rate of 
one of the options (without loss of generality, Option B). Specifically, the 25 trials of each 
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problem were pooled to five blocks of five trials each, and the goal was to predict the mean 
aggregate choice rates in each of the five time-blocks. Since the exact nature of the problems was 
unknown to modelers at the time of model development, a competing model was required to get 
as input the values of the parameters defining each problem and provide as output a sequence of 
five predictions (each in the range [0,1]) for the mean choice rates in that problem.  
Interested participants were required to register for the competition in advance. Each 
person could register as the (co-)author of no more than two submissions per track, and be the 
first author of no more than one submission per track. In addition, each person could make one 
additional early-bird submission, sent to the organizers by the end of January 2018. Submissions 
had to be made on or before the Submission Deadline (July 24th, 2018). For the first track, this 
meant sending the organizers a complete, functional, documented code of the submission. The 
code could be written in Python, Matlab, R, or SAS. The code was required to read the 
parameters of a choice problem and provide as output a prediction for the choice rates in five 
time-blocks.  
One day after the Submission Deadline, the organizers published the competition set 
problems. That is, submissions to the first track were blind to the problems on which they were 
tested. Participants were then required to run their code on the competition set problems and 
submit the predictions. Finally, the organizers published the data to be predicted so participants 
could evaluate their prediction error. The organizers verified the code for each of the top 10 
submissions produces the reported predictions and published the results.  
Submitted models were evaluated and ranked based on the prediction accuracy as 
measured by the Mean Squared Error (MSE) between the observed and the predicted choice rates 
(300 predictions corresponding to 60 problems X 5 blocks). In addition, the organizers 
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computed, using a bootstrap analysis, a confidence interval for the difference in prediction MSEs 
between each submission and the winner, for different subsamples of problems. Specifically, we 
simulated 2501 sets of 60 test problems each by sampling with replacement from the original test 
set, computed the MSE of each submission in each simulated set, and then computed the 
difference in MSE between the winner and each submission. This allows the creation of a 95% 
CI for the difference in predictive performance between the winner and the other submissions 
using Package boot (52) in R.  
Data availability. 
The complete raw experimental data are available in Zenodo with the identifier 
doi:10.5281/zenodo.2571510.(53) 
Code availability. 
Code for the software used to generate the experimental data, for the competition’s 
baseline models, and for the winning submission is available from the authors upon a reasonable 
request. Code for baseline models is also available from the competition’s website (https://cpc-
18.com). Code for submissions that did not win the competition is available from the authors 
upon reasonable request, contingent on permission from the developers of those submissions.  
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Supplementary Information 
Choice Prediction Competition 
Space of problems. 
The space of problems used in CPC18 includes 14 dimensions. Dimensions Block and 
Feedback are studied within problem: The 25 choice trials are divided to 5 blocks of 5 trials 
each, such that Feedback is absent in the 1st block and complete in the other four blocks. The 
dimension Amb sets whether Option B is ambiguous. Dimension Corr sets the correlation 
between the options’ payoffs. The 10 dimensions defining the payoff distributions of the options 
are: LA, HA, pHA, LotNumA, LotShapeA, LB, HB, pHB, LotNumB, LotShapeB. In particular, Option 
A provides a lottery, which has expected value of HA, with probability pHA and provides LA 
otherwise (with probability 1 − pHA). Similarly, Option B provides a lottery, which has expected 
value of HB, with probability pHB, and provides LB otherwise (with probability 1 − pHB). The 
distribution of the lottery of Option A (Option B) around its expected value HA (HB) is 
determined by the parameters LotNumA (LotNumB) that defines the number of possible outcomes 
in the lottery, and LotShapeA (LotShapeB) that defines whether the distribution is symmetric 
around its mean, right-skewed, left-skewed, or undefined (if LotNum = 1). 
When a lottery is defined (i.e. LotNumA and/or LotNumB > 1), its shape can be either 
“Symm”, “R-skew,” or “L-skew”. When the shape equals “Symm” the lottery’s possible outcomes 
are generated by adding the following terms to its EV (HA or HB): −k/2, −k/2+1, …, k/2-1, and 
k/2, where k = LotNum − 1 (hence the lottery includes exactly LotNum possible outcomes). The 
lottery’s distribution around its mean is binomial, with parameters k and ½. In other words, the 
lottery’s distribution is a form of discretization of a normal distribution with mean HA or HB. 
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Formally, if in a particular trial the lottery is drawn (which happens with probability pHA or 
pHB), the outcome generated is:  
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When the lottery’s shape equals “R-skew,” its possible outcomes are generated by adding 
the following terms to its EV: C+ + 21, C+ + 22, …, C+ + 2n, where n = LotNum and C+ = −n − 1. 
When the lottery’s shape equals “L-skew,” the possible outcomes are generated by adding the 
following terms to its EV: C− − 21, C− − 22, …, C− − 2n, where C− = n + 1 (and n = LotNum). 
Note that C+ and C− are constants that keep the lottery’s distribution at either HA or HB. In both 
cases (R-skew and L-skew), the lottery’s distribution around its mean is a truncated geometric 
distribution with the parameter ½ (with the last term’s probability adjusted up such that the 
distribution is well-defined). That is, the distribution is skewed: very large outcomes in R-skew 
and very small outcomes in L-skew are obtained with small probabilities. 
Problem selection algorithm. 
The 120 problems in Experiments 1 and 2 were generated according to the following 
algorithm:  
1. Draw randomly EVA’ ~ Uni(-10, 30) (a discrete uniform distribution) 
2. Draw number of outcomes for Option A, NA:  
2.1. With probability .4 (NA = 1), set: LA = HA = EVA’; pHA = 1; LotNumA = 1; and 
LotShapeA = “-” 
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2.2. With probability .6 (NA > 1), draw pHA uniformly from the set {.01, .05, .1, .2, .25, .4, 
.5, .6, .75, .8, .9, .95, .99, 1}  
2.2.1. If pHA = 1 then set LA = HA = EVA’ 
2.2.2. If pHA < 1 then draw an outcome temp ~ Triangular[-50, EVA’, 120]  
2.2.2.1. If Round(temp) > EVA’ then set HA = Round(temp);  
LA = Round[(EVA’ – HA ∙ pHA)/(1 − pHA)] 
2.2.2.2. If Round(temp) < EVA’ then set LA = Round(temp);  
HA = Round{[EVA’ – LA(1 – pHA)]/pHA}  
2.2.2.3. If round(temp) = EVA’ then set LA = HA = EVA’ 
2.2.3. Set lottery for Option A: 
2.2.3.1. With probability 0.6 the lottery is degenerate. Set LotNumA = 1 and 
LotShapeA = “-” 
2.2.3.2. With probability 0.2 the lottery is skewed. Draw temp uniformly from the 
set {-7, -6, … ,-3, -2, 2, 3, … , 7, 8}  
2.2.3.2.1. If temp > 0 then set LotNumA = temp and LotShapeA = “R-skew” 
2.2.3.2.2. If temp < 0 then set LotNumA = -temp and LotShapeA = “L-skew” 
2.2.3.3. With probability 0.2 the lottery is symmetric. Set LotShapeA = “Symm” 
and draw LotNumA uniformly from the set {3, 5, 7, 9} 
3. Draw difference in expected values between options, DEV:
5
i
i = 1
1
U
5
= DEV , where Ui ~ Uni[-
20, 20]  
4. Set EVB’ = EVA + DEV, where EVA is the real expected value of Option A. 
4.1. If EVB’ < -50 stop and start the process over 
5. Draw pHB uniformly from the set {.01, .05, .1, .2, .25, .4, .5, .6, .75, .8, .9, .95, .99, 1} 
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5.1. If pHB = 1 then set LB = HB = Round(EVB’) 
5.2. If pHB < 1 then draw an outcome temp ~ Triangular[-50, EVB’, 120] 
5.2.1. If Round(temp) > EVB’ ten set HB = Round(temp);  
LB = Round[(EVB’ – HB ∙ pHB)/(1 – pHB)]  
5.2.2. If Round(temp) < EVB’ then set LB = Round(temp);  
HB = Round{[EVB’ – LB(1 – pHB)]/pHB}  
6. Set lottery for Option B:  
6.1. With probability 0.5 the lottery is degenerate. Set LotNumB = 1 and LotShapeB = “-” 
6.2. With probability 0.25 the lottery is skewed. Draw temp uniformly from the set  
{-7, -6, … ,-3, -2, 2, 3, … , 7, 8}  
6.2.1. If temp > 0 then set LotNumB = temp and LotShapeB = “R-skew” 
6.2.2. If temp < 0 then set LotNumB = -temp and LotShapeB = “L-skew” 
6.3. With probability 0.25 the lottery is symmetric. Set LotShapeB = “Symm” and draw 
LotNumB uniformly from the set {3, 5, 7, 9} 
7. Draw Corr: 0 with probability .8; 1 with probability .1; -1 with probability .1 
8. Draw Amb: 0 with probability .8; 1 otherwise. 
In addition, in the following cases the generated problem is not used for technical 
reasons: (a) there was a positive probability for an outcome larger than 256 or an outcome 
smaller than -50; (b) options were indistinguishable from participants’ perspectives (i.e., had the 
same distributions and Amb = 0); (c) Amb = 1, but Option B had only one possible outcome; and 
(d) at least one option had no variance, but the options were correlated. 
Moreover, problems in Experiment 2 were selected using a stratified sampling procedure 
from a large pool of problems selected according to the above algorithm. This procedure was 
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aimed to obtain for Experiment 2 roughly the same number of problems of the types “each 
option up to 2 outcomes”, “exactly one problem with more than 2 outcomes”, and “both options 
with more than 2 outcomes” as their numbers in Experiment 1. 
Baseline models. 
The organizers presented two baseline models, both heavily influenced by the model 
BEAST (Best Estimate and Sampling Tools) (10). BEAST relies on six behavioral mechanisms. 
Specifically, it assumes that each option’s prospect is evaluated as the sum of three terms: the 
best estimate for the prospect’s expected value (EV), estimation noise which is reduced when the 
problem is “trivial”, and the average of a small mentally drawn sample. Elements in the small 
mental sample are drawn using one of four sampling tools (that imply 4 behavioral mechanisms): 
unbiased (a draw from the objective distributions, implying sensitivity to the probability of 
immediate regret, and preference for the option which is better most of the time (54)), equal 
weighting (a draw from a distribution in which all the prospects’ outcomes are considered 
equally likely (55)), sign (a draw from a distribution in which all the prospects’ payoffs with the 
same sign have the same valence, implying sensitivity to payoff sign), and contingent pessimism 
(a bias towards the worst possible outcome, implying pessimism).  
The first baseline model presented, BEAST.sd (BEAST subjective dominance), is a 
purely behavioral (i.e. uses no element of statistical learning) extension of BEAST which 
changes the definition of a “trivial” problem for the purpose of reduced noise. BEAST used an 
objective definition (the existence of stochastic dominance), whereas BEAST.sd uses a 
subjective definition. Specifically, a problem is likely to be perceived as trivial if both the EV 
rule and the equal weighting rule favor the same prospect, and the choice of that prospect does 
not lead to immediate regret. BEAST.sd further assumes that in complex problems (a problem in 
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which one option has at least 2 possible outcomes and the other has at least 3 possible outcomes), 
the estimation noise is increased. Finally, BEAST.sd assumes faster learning from feedback in 
ambiguous problems.  
The second baseline, psychological forest (11), is a hybrid model using a random forest 
algorithm with 31 features. Fourteen of the features are the dimensions that define the choice 
problem (see section Space of problems): LA, HA, pHA, LotNumA, LotShapeA, LB, HB, pHB, 
LotNumB, LotShapeB, Amb, Corr, Block, and Feedback (= 0 in the first block; = 1 otherwise). 
Sixteen additional features are behavioral insights. Four of these were defined by the developers 
of psychological forest as “naïve”, as they capture basic domain knowledge that will be likely 
integrated into an algorithm even without any knowledge of behavioral theories. These include 
the difference between the prospects’ expected values, the difference between their standard 
deviations, the difference between their minimal outcomes, and the difference between their 
maximal outcomes. Twelve additional features were considered “psychological”. They were 
hand-crafted in direct relation to the underlying logic of BEAST, and each was inspired by at 
least one of the six behavioral mechanisms in BEAST. For example, to capture sensitivity to the 
probability of regret, psychological forest includes the difference between the probability that 
Option A provides a better payoff than Option B and the probability that Option B provides a 
better payoff than option A. Positive (negative) values of this feature imply that Option A (B) is 
more likely to lead to less immediate regret than Option B (A). The equations defining the 
features all appear in the original psychological forest paper.  
Random forest is an ensemble algorithm that during training constructs a series of many 
individual decision trees and provides as a prediction the mean prediction of all individual trees. 
During training, each tree is constructed using only a random subsample of the training data, and 
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at each split, a random subset of features is considered. These properties are meant to decrease 
correlation between the different trees. Psychological Forest was originally created using 
package randomForest (28) in R, using the default set of hyperparameters for regression. In 
particular, at each split, one third of the features was considered for splitting the data. 
Open source code for both baselines, in several programming languages, is available 
through the competition’s website (https://cpc-18.com). 
Competition’s winner. 
The winning model was an extreme gradient boosting regressor (26) using the XGBoost 
Python package and trained using the same input features as the psychological forest baseline 
model described above. Like the random forest regressor used for psychological forest, gradient 
boosted regressors are ensembles of individual “weak learners”, typically tree-based regressors. 
In contrast to random forest, which averages the results of many decision trees, gradient boosting 
is a stepwise optimization procedure that minimizes error by adding one tree at a time to predict 
the residuals of an initial tree or the current ensemble of previous trees. The hyperparameters of 
the winning XGBoost model were the implementation defaults except for the following, which 
were found using the skopt Python package for black-box Bayesian hyperparameter 
optimization: Booster = “gbtree”; Gamma (minimum loss reduction required to make a further 
partition on a leaf node of the tree) = 0.01224; Boosting Learning Rate = 0.01088; Maximum 
Tree Depth = 3; Number of Estimators (Trees) = 978; Alpha (L1 regularization term on weights) 
= 0.04306; Lambda (L2 regularization term on weights) = 2.90538; Subsample ratio of columns 
when constructing each tree = 0.99120; Subsample ratio of the training instance = 0.50796. 
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Second track of the choice prediction competition. 
CPC18 included two parallel and independent tracks. The paper focuses on the first track 
and here we briefly describe the second track. A more focused account of the second track will 
appear in a future paper.  
Second track task.  
The second track in CPC18 focused on prediction of the choices made by individual 
decision makers. The goal was to predict, for each of 30 “target” individual decision makers, the 
progression over time (in five time blocks of five trials each) of the mean choice rate of Option B 
in each of five “target” choice problems. Specifically, the organizers randomly selected 30 of the 
240 decision makers who participated in Experiment 1 to be the target decision makers. For each 
of them, the organizers then randomly selected five of the 30 problems they faced and removed 
the data from the training data available to participants in the competition. The training data in 
this track thus included full sequences, of 25 choices each, made by each of the 30 target 
individuals in 25 different (non-target) choice problems (taken from the same space of 
problems), as well as data regarding behavior of other (non-target) decision makers in the five 
target problems. Thus, models submitted to this track has to provide 750 predictions in the range 
[0, 1] (30 target decision makers X 5 target problems per decision maker X 5 blocks of choices 
per problem).  
Protocol for participation in the second track was slightly different, and simpler, than for 
the first track. Specifically, participants were not required to submit their codes to the organizers, 
only their numeric predictions. The reason for this change is that participants in the second track 
knew in advance the (anonymous) identity of the target decision makers they are tested on and 
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their corresponding target problems (the nature of the test problems in the first track was 
unknown at time of submission).  
Second track baseline models.  
The organizers presented two baseline models for the second track. The first, naïve 
baseline, predicts that each individual target decision maker in each block of its individual target 
problems would behave the same as the average decision maker behaves in the same block of 
that problem. The average decision maker’s behavior is estimated as the mean aggregate 
behavior of all decision makers for which training data exists (there are at least 90 decision 
makers for each such problem). 
Surprisingly, the organizers did not find it easy to defeat this naïve baseline by a large 
margin. Using many statistical learning techniques, and employing knowledge extracted from the 
psychological literature (e.g. based on BEAST), the best baseline that they could find was the use 
of a Factorization Machine (FM) (56), a predictor based on Support Vector Machines and 
factorization models, which is employed in collaborative filtering settings (i.e. settings in which 
the goal is to generate predictions regarding the tastes of particular users, for whom some data 
exists, using information on the tastes of many other users, as in the Netflix Challenge). Each 
observation supplied to the baseline implementation of the FM is composed of a long binary 
feature vector with only two non-zero elements that correspond to the active decision maker and 
the active block within an active problem. The response is the observed choice rate of the active 
decision maker in the active block of the active problem (first transformed to imply the 
maximization rate of the problem, and then after making the prediction transformed back to 
implying the choice rate of Option B). This means the FM model did not directly use the 
knowledge that behavior across different blocks of the same problem is likely correlated.  
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Second track submissions and results.  
Twelve submissions were made before the deadline. None of the submissions provided 
better predictions than the naïve baseline (including the FM baseline model). In fact, the winning 
submission (made by two of the authors of the paper, ECC and JFC) was very similar in concept 
to this naïve baseline. The primary difference was that the choice-problem and block-wise 
average was calculated with a 10-fold cross-validation procedure. The training data supplied to 
contestants were split into ten sets of training, validation, and test data such that each test and 
validation dataset included data only from those choice problems that were known to be in the 
held-out dataset. The prediction for a given test observation in fold i on choice problem j in block 
k was the average choice made in the training data in fold i for problem j in block k. MSE was 
calculated for each of the ten validation datasets, and the fold with the lowest MSE was 
identified. The training data from that best performing fold was used to make predictions on the 
held-out data following the same choice-problem and block-wise average procedure 
Four submissions did not provide statistically inferior predictions to those of the winner. 
Table S2 provides details on these submissions. Importantly, all the best submissions heavily 
relied on the predictions of the naïve baseline. 
Registrants Post-competition Survey 
After results of CPC18 were published, the organizers sent co-authors of registered teams 
E-mail invitations to complete a short anonymous survey with questions regarding their effort 
and thoughts on the competition. A total of 72 invitations were sent (out of 82 registered persons; 
to register, a team had to supply an Email address of only the lead author and the organizers 
could not recover the addresses of 10 co-authors), and 36 researchers answered the survey. Nine 
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people indicated they were only registered to the first track of CPC18, 7 indicated they were only 
registered to the second track, and 20 indicated they were registered to both tracks.  
Responders came from diverse backgrounds, ranging from computer science and 
artificial intelligence to cognitive or mathematical psychology. The most common main field of 
research was behavioral economics with 25% of the answers. Responders indicated they had a 
moderate amount to a lot of coding experience (M = 3.42, SD = 1.21) and a moderate amount of 
experience modeling human behavior (M = 2.94; SD = 1.45).  
Twenty-four of the 29 responders who were registered to the first track indicated they 
also tried working on a submission to that track (only 3 stated they did not try to work on a 
submission, and 2 did not answer the question), and 16 of them submitted a model by the 
deadline. Those who tried working on a submission to the first track stated they spent on average 
66.5 hours (SD = 92.2) working on CPC18, and that they tried developing an average of 12.6 
different models to the data (SD = 33.3). Sixteen of the 24 also stated they were able to develop a 
model that outperforms the baseline models. 
Nineteen of the 27 responders who were registered to the second track indicated they also 
tried working on a submission to that track (6 stated they did not try to work on a submission, 
and 2 did not answer the question), and 10 of them submitted a model by the deadline. Those 
who tried working on a submission to the second track stated they spent on average 84.7 hours 
(SD = 118.9) working on CPC18, and that they tried developing an average of 29.1 different 
models to the data (SD = 59.6). Only 5 of the 19 stated they were able to develop a model that 
outperforms the baseline models in this track. Note the reported averages for hours spent on 
CPC18 and numbers of models developed for the two tracks include in some cases the same 
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response (for persons working on submissions to both tracks), and thus they should not be 
interpreted as the mean effort invested in each track, but as a general effort invested in CPC18.   
Foresight Comparisons Implementation Details 
Cumulative prospect theory.  
We compared BEAST to two versions of cumulative prospect theory (CPT) (21): 
deterministic and stochastic. The only difference between the two versions was that in the 
stochastic version, CPT’s weighted values of the options’ prospects (WV(A), WV(B)), were 
transformed to a probabilistic prediction for choice of Option B over Option A using a standard 
logit transformation: 
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is a subjective utility function with α a diminishing 
sensitivity parameter (note we use the same parameter for gains and losses, following the 
suggestion in (57)), and λ a loss aversion parameter, and: 
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The latter is a two-parameter subjective weighting function (58) with γ a probability sensitivity 
parameter and δ the function’s elevation parameter. 
For the deterministic version, best fit for the training data was obtained for α = 0.88, γ = 
0.89, δ = 0.9, λ = 1.2. For the stochastic version, best fit was obtained for α = 0.91, γ = 0.84, δ = 
0.83, λ = 1.14, and μ = 0.25. 
Priority heuristic. 
The priority heuristic (PH) (35) is said to be triggered only for choice between lotteries 
with similar EVs. Following others (59), we screened each problem according to the ratio 
between the options’ EVs: If it is greater than 2, then PH is not triggered. We assumed instead 
that in such cases the option with the higher EV is selected. If the ratio is smaller than 2, PH is 
used as follows (note PH requires no fitting of parameters, so it was not technically fit to the 
training data): 
1. Consider the minimal possible outcomes of the two options. If the difference between 
them exceeds an outcome aspiration level, stop and choose the option with the higher 
minimal outcome. Otherwise, continue to step 2. The outcome aspiration level is 1/10 
of the highest absolute possible outcome in the problem, rounded to the nearest 
prominent number (1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500 etc.).  
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2. Consider the probabilities associated with each of the minimal outcomes of the two 
options. If the difference between them exceeds 0.1, stop and choose the option with 
the lower probability for a minimal outcome. Otherwise, continue to step 3. 
3. Consider the maximal possible outcome of the two options. If the difference between 
them exceeds the outcome aspiration level, stop and choose the option with the higher 
maximal outcome. Otherwise, continue to step 4.  
4. Consider the probabilities associated with each of the maximal outcomes of the two 
options. If the difference between them exceeds 0.1, stop and choose the option with 
the higher probability for a maximal outcome. Otherwise, predict indifference between 
the lotteries.  
Decision by sampling.  
The decision by sampling model for risky choice (36, 60) states that choice is set by a 
series of ordinal comparisons between target attribute values and a comparison attribute value. 
An accumulator tallies the number of favorable comparisons to one of the options and when the 
tally hits a threshold, the option that won more comparisons is chosen. Target attribute values are 
chosen randomly at each time step. Comparison attribute values are also chosen randomly, 
though they can be chosen either from the alternative option or from long term memory.  
We used the implementation from 
http://www.stewart.warwick.ac.uk/software/DbS/source_code.html. As “context” that is used for 
long term memory retrievals, we used the supplied csv files from the same source, providing 
“real world distributions of amounts and probabilities”. Before implementing the code, amounts 
(from the “real world distribution”) were converted from British Pounds to Israeli Shekels at an 
exchange rate of 4.5 shekel per pound.  
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Three free parameters were fitted to the decisions under risk subsample from the training 
data: outcome threshold and probability threshold, which are the minimal amount and probability 
by which a target attribute value should exceed the comparison attribute value to be considered 
favorable, and a choice threshold, which is the number of comparisons an option needs to win in 
order to be chosen. Best fit was obtained for the values 1, 0.1, and 1, for outcome threshold, 
probability threshold, and choice threshold respectively.  
Analysis of Additional Datasets 
Method 
Data. 
The data comes from two related choice prediction competitions for human decisions in 
simple extensive form games (37). It includes 240 two-person games in which each of the 
players simultaneously chooses between one of two actions. Player 1 chooses either in or out, 
and Player 2 chooses either right or left. If Player 1 chooses out, the choice of Player 2 does not 
impact the payoff of either player, but if Player 1 chooses in, the two payoffs are dictated by the 
choice of Player 2. The games, uniquely defined by 6 game-parameters, include versions of the 
ultimatum game (61), the dictator game (62), the trust game (63) and the gift exchange game 
(64), in addition to many other different types of games. The two competitions were held to 
predict the decisions of the first players and those of the second players. Games were explicitly 
described to both players, and there was no feedback nor communication between the players. 
The experiments used the strategy-method according to which players mark their choices without 
knowledge regarding the choices the other players make. Therefore, in each pair, choices made 
by the two players were independent. Additional information regarding the setting is given in the 
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original paper and in the competitions’ website: 
https://sites.google.com/site/extformpredcomp/home. 
In each competition, data regarding choices made in 120 problems (training data) was 
made public. The goal was to predict the choice behavior in the other 120 problems (test data). 
To facilitate development of models, the organizers of the two competitions presented their best 
baseline models trained on the train data. Baselines for both competitions were similar and 
assumed players consider one of seven strategies: (a) choosing rationally (according to the 
rational model), (b) choosing rationally, but in case of indifference choosing such that the other 
player’s payoff is maximized, (c) maximize the worst personal payoff, (d) choose rationally, but 
assuming the other player chooses randomly (level-1), (e) maximize the joint payoff, (f) 
minimize the difference between the two players’ payoffs, (g) maximize the payoff of the player 
with the lowest payoff. The difference between the two baseline models was in the implied 
behavior in each strategy, and in the parameters used. Moreover, not all seven strategies apply to 
both players (e.g. for the second player, choosing rationally and maximizing the worst payoff are 
exactly the same). Each competition received 14 submissions. The baseline model for prediction 
of the first players was ranked 8th in the competition with MSE = 0.00853. The winner of that 
competition obtained MSE = 0.00735. The baseline model for prediction of the second players 
was ranked 11th in the competition with MSE = 0.00415. The winner of that competition 
obtained MSE = 0.00346.   
Development of hybrid models. 
To develop the models based on the insight-foresight method we propose, we started with 
the baseline models and decomposed them to the theoretical mechanisms they imply are the main 
drivers of choice. Specifically, the behavioral insights we derived are the predictions made by the 
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seven strategies assumed by the baseline models. In addition, we also used as foresight the 
predictions made by the baseline models themselves (fitted on the training data). Finally, we also 
added the six game-parameters as “objective” features. We then applied an off-the-shelf Random 
Forest algorithm (using randomForest package (28) in R), without any training of 
hyperparamters, and with the objective features, the insights-features, and the foresight-feature to 
the data. We repeated the process 15 times and the predictions were averaged. Error were 
computed based on an average of 20 such runs. 
Technical details of results 
In prediction of the decisions made by the first players, the hybrid model using both 
insights and foresights based on the competition’s baseline obtained MSE = 0.00693. This thus 
provides a new state-of-the-art level of prediction for these data, outperforming the winner of the 
competition. Running a similar model without the foresight feature gives MSE = 0.00768. A 
model without the insight features gives MSE = 0.00985. 
 In prediction of the decisions made by the second players, the hybrid model using both 
insights and foresights based on the competition’s baseline obtained MSE = 0.00400. Such a 
submission to the competition would have been ranked 5th (jointly). Analyses of the four 
submissions that obtained better predictions suggests that all of them used behavioral ideas that 
were not implemented in the current model (or the baseline). Therefore, the hybrid improves 
upon the baseline but cannot outperform models that use additional theoretical elements it is not 
supplied with (particularly for such small data). Running a similar model without the foresight 
feature gives MSE = 0.00462. A model without the insight features gives MSE = 0.00735. 
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Figure S1. Example of a translated experimental screen in a choice problem with Amb = 0 and 
Corr = -1. 
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Figure S2. Example of a translated experimental screen in an ambiguous choice problem with 
Amb = 1 and Corr = 0. 
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Figure S3. Example of a translated experimental screen (in a choice problem with Amb = 0, 
Corr = 0, LotNumA = 4) when full feedback is given (blocks 2–5). The participant here chose 
Option B. 
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Table S1. 
Submissions not statistically worse than the winner in the first track. 
   Prediction  
Rank ID Type MSE 
(x100) 
ENO Short description 
1 BP47 Hybrid 0.569 23.7 Winner: See text 
2 MS63 Behavioral 0.589 22.7 BEAST.sd modified to have different 
weights to the best estimate of the 
expected value and the outcome of the 
mental simulations. Weights depend on 
the availability of feedback and the 
possibility of a loss. Additional noise 
when predictions are extreme 
3 MS03 Behavioral 0.605 22.0 Same as MS63 with additional biases 
favoring dominant options whose 
dominance structure is clear and 
options avoiding losses (or with low 
probability for losses) under several 
conditions concerning differences in 
number of outcomes, minimal 
outcomes, maximal outcomes, EVs, and 
modes of the two options. 
4 HK73 Behavioral 0.613 21.7 BEAST.sd modified to have different 
weights to the best estimate of the 
expected value and the outcome of the 
mental simulations, as a personal trait, 
and a possible alternation in choice in 
non-feedback trials. 
5 KH04 Behavioral 0.614 21.6 BEAST.sd modified to have different 
weights to the best estimate of the 
expected value and the outcome of the 
mental simulations, as a personal trait.  
6 KH75 Hybrid 0.621 21.4 Ensemble of 12 models: 5 similar to 
BEAST, 6 similar to Psychological 
Forest (differing in foresight prediction) 
and one logistic regression model 
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submitted to CPC15 
7 CJ25 Hybrid 0.640 20.6 Ensemble of BEAST.sd and a random 
forest algorithm using several insights 
from Psychological Forest, several new 
insights (e.g. difference in expected 
regret) and several foresights, including 
BEAST.sd and cumulative prospect 
theory. 
8 LC33 Behavioral 0.648 20.3 BEAST.sd modified to have different 
weights to the best estimate of the 
expected value and the outcome of the 
mental simulations. Weights depend on 
the availability of feedback. 
− Psych. 
Forest 
Hybrid 0.663 19.8 Baseline: See text 
9 SS88 Hybrid 0.668 19.6 Psychological Forest modified to use 
foresight BEAST.sd instead of BEAST, 
and two other features: one marking 
how distant the mean aggregate 
(predicted) behavior is from 50%, the 
other marking the (predicted) over-time 
trend in decision makers’ choice. 
10 SA49 Hybrid 0.672 19.5 Psychological Forest modified to use 
BEAST.sd instead of BEAST as 
foresight, and a feature marking how 
distant the mean aggregate (predicted) 
behavior is from 50%. 
11 HB89 Behavioral 0.692 18.8 BEAST.sd modified to replace the EV 
part of the model with a utility model 
accounting for dispersion and 
skewness. 
− BEAST.sd Behavioral 0.702 18.5 Baseline: See text 
12 RY01 Behavioral 0.706 18.4 BEAST.sd modified to increase noise 
when predictions are extreme. 
13 BH45 Behavioral 0.741 17.4 BEAST.sd modified to replace the EV 
part of the model with a utility model 
accounting for dispersion and 
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skewness. 
14 SB18 Hybrid 0.749 17.2 Psychological Forest modified to 
include many additional foresights, 
each of which is the difference between 
the options’ utilities assuming either 
some version of cumulative prospect 
theory or some version of regret theory.  
15 ML35 Behavioral 0.823 15.4 BEAST.sd modified to include 
increased error in problems with and 
aversion to options with many 
outcomes and high payoff range. 
Note. Only models providing predictions not statistically worse than the winner are presented. To test for 
differences is predictive performance, we used a bootstrap procedure with 2501 samples from the 
competition set problems and computed a percentile-type 95% CI for the difference between MSEs of the 
winner and each model. ENO = Equivalent number of observations. 
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Table S2. 
Submissions not statistically worse than the winner in the second track 
Rank ID MSE (x100) Short description 
− Naïve 9.399 Baseline: See text 
1 CC31 9.405 Winner: See text 
2 CL34 9.415 For target agents whose behavior in the non-target games 
is more similar to a variant of BEAST (Submission LC33 
from the first track), use as prediction the variant of 
BEAST. For other agents, predict like the naïve baseline. 
− FM 9.630 Baseline: See text 
3 EH51 9.706 Logistic regression with the following predictors: 
prediction of the naïve baseline, dummy for higher-EV 
option, target individual maximization rate in non-target 
problems, output of a logistic transformation of the 
difference between options’ EVs, and several interactions 
between these predictors and a dummy for a non-
ambiguous problem.  
4 CJ26 9.803 Ensemble of the naïve baseline and a random forest 
algorithm as in Submission CJ25 from the first track. 
5 EC02 9.973 A type of tree-based regression (Cubist) using each 
dimension that described a problem, various averages 
based on those dimensions and subject information, as 
well as features calculated by BEAST.sd. 
Note. Only models providing predictions not statistically worse than the winner are presented. To test for 
differences is predictive performance, we used a bootstrap procedure with 2501 samples from the group 
of target decision makers and computed a percentile-type 95% CI for the difference between MSEs of the 
winner and each model. 
 
 
 
 
